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Abstract— We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash
equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We
extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case
when the players’ cost functions may be affected by the actions
of any subset of players. An interference graph is employed to il-
lustrate the partially-coupled cost functions and the asymmetric
information requirements. For a given interference graph, we
design a generalized communication graph so that players with
possibly partially-coupled cost functions exchange only their
required information and make decisions based on them. Using
a set of standard assumptions on the cost functions, interference
and communication graphs, we prove almost sure convergence
to a Nash equilibrium for diminishing step sizes. We then
quantify the effect of the second largest eigenvalue of the
expected communication matrix on the convergence rate, and
illustrate the trade-off between the parameters associated with
the communication and the interference graphs. Finally, the
efficacy of the proposed algorithm on a large-scale networked
game is demonstrated via simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed seeking of Nash equilibria in networked games
has received considerable attention in recent years [1]–[8].
A networked game can be represented by a graphical model
which enables us to index the cost function of each player as
a function of player’s own actions and those of his neighbors
in the graph. There are many real-world applications that
motivate us to generalize the Nash seeking problem to a
graphical game setup [5], [6]. The collection of transmitters
and receivers in a wireless data network can be captured
as a graphical model. Interferences among the transmitters
and receivers affect the players’ signal-to-interference ratio
(SIR) [7]. An optical network is another relevant application
that can be modeled as a graphical game. The channels are
assumed to be the players and interferences, which affect the
optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) of each channel, can be
modeled by graph edges, [9].
In this work we design a locally distributed algorithm for
Nash equilibrium seeking in a graphical game. In such a
game, the players’ cost functions may be affected by the
actions of any subset of players. They exchange the required
information locally according to a communication graph and
update their actions to optimize their cost functions. Due
to limited information available from local neighbors, each
player maintains an estimate of the other players’ actions and
update their estimates during the iterations.
Literature review. A graphical game is a succinct rep-
resentation of a multi-player game considering the local
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interactions and the sparsity of the interferences. A graphical
game can be simply described by an undirected graph called
interference graph in which the players are marked by the
vertices and the interferences are represented by the edges
[10], [11].
The idea of a graphical game has been used in various
areas. In congestion games, [12] considers a generalization to
graphical games. The model involves the spatial positioning
of the players which affects their performances. A conflict
graph is defined to specify the players that cause congestion
to each other. A methodology is presented in [8] for games
with local cost functions which are dependent on information
from only a set of local neighboring agents. Extra state
space variables are defined for the game to achieve a desired
degree of locality. For dynamical games, graphical games are
considered where the dynamic of each player depends only
on local neighbor information [13]. A stronger definition of
interactive Nash equilibrium is used to guarantee a unique
Nash equilibrium. The information flow is restricted by a
communication graph which is identical to the interference
graph. In an economic setting, [14] draws attention to the
problem of ”who interacts with whom” in a network. This pa-
per states the importance of communication with neighboring
players in the network. The effect of local peers on increasing
the usage level of consumers is addressed in [15]. Using
word-of-mouth communication, the players typically form
their opinions about the quality of a product and improve
their purchasing behavior according to the information they
obtain from their local peers.
For generalized convex games the problem of finding a
Nash equilibrium is studied in [16]. The communication
graph is identical to the interference graph. A connected
communication graph is considered in [17] for aggregative
games. For a large class of convex games, [18] proposes
an asynchronous gossip-based algorithm over a connected
communication graph for a complete interference graph.
In this work, we generalize the algorithm in [18] to
the case where the interference graph is not a complete
graph, i.e., the players’ cost functions may depend on the
actions of any ”subset” of players. A communication graph,
which is a subset of the interference graph, is designed for
the network. We prove that there is lower bound for the
communication graph under which the algorithm converges
to a Nash equilibrium for diminishing step sizes. We then
investigate the convergence rate of the algorithm. The results
show a trade-off between the parameters associated with
the communication graph and the ones associated with the
interference graph.
Due to space limitations most of the proofs are omitted.
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A. Graph Theory Notions
The following definitions are from [19], [20]. A subgraph
H of a graph G is a graph whose vertices and edges are a
subset of the vertex set and edge set of G, respectively. A
subgraph H is a spanning subgraph of G, if it contains all
the vertices of G. A triangle-free subgraph H of a graph G
is a subgraph in which no three vertices form a triangle of
edges. H is a maximal triangle-free subgraph of G if adding
a missing edge to H creates a triangle.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a multi-player game in a network with a set of
players V = {1, . . . , N}. For i ∈ V , there is a real-valued
function Ji indicating player i’s individual cost function. The
players’ cost functions are not necessarily fully coupled in
the sense that they may be affected by the actions of any
number of other players. To illustrate the partially coupled
cost functions, we define an interference graph, denoted by
GI(V,EI), with EI marking player pairs that interfere one
with another. We denote with NI(i), the set of neighbors of
player i in GI , i.e., NI(i) := {j ∈ V |(i, j) ∈ EI}. We also
define N˜I(i) := NI(i) ∪ {i}.
Assumption 1. GI is connected and undirected.
Let Ωj ⊂ R denote the action set of player j. We denote
by Ω the action set of all players, i.e., Ω =
∏
i∈V Ωi ⊂
RN where
∏
denotes the Cartesian product. For i ∈ V ,
Ji : Ω
i → R is the cost function of player i where
Ωi =
∏
j∈N˜I(i) Ωj ⊂ R|N˜I(i)| is the action set of players
affecting the cost function of player i. The game denoted by
G(V,Ωi, Ji, GI) is defined based on the set of players V , the
action set Ωi, ∀i ∈ V , the cost function Ji, ∀i ∈ V and GI .
For i ∈ V , let xi = (xi, xi−i) ∈ Ωi, with xi ∈ Ωi
and xi−i ∈ Ωi−i :=
∏
j∈NI(i) Ωj , denote the other players’
actions which affect the cost function of player i. Let also
x = (xi, x−i) ∈ Ω, with xi ∈ Ωi and x−i ∈ Ω−i :=∏
j∈V/{i}Ωj , denote all other players’ actions except i.
The game defined on GI is played such that for given
xi−i ∈ Ωi−i, each player i aims to minimize his own cost
function selfishly to find an optimal action,
minimize
yi
Ji(yi, x
i
−i)
subject to yi ∈ Ωi.
(1)
Note that there are N separate simultaneous optimization
problems and each of them is run by a particular player i.
We assume that the cost function Ji and the action set Ωi are
only available to player i. Thus every player knows which
other players’ actions affect his cost function.
A Nash equilibrium of the game for the case when GI is
not a complete graph is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Consider an N -player game G(V,Ωi, Ji, GI),
each player i minimizing the cost function Ji : Ωi → R. A
vector x∗ = (x∗i , x
∗
−i) ∈ Ω is called a Nash equilibrium of
this game if for every given xi−i
∗ ∈ Ωi−i
Ji(x
∗
i , x
i ∗
−i) ≤ Ji(xi, xi ∗−i) ∀xi ∈ Ωi, ∀i ∈ V. (2)
The players are required to exchange some information to
update their actions. A communication graph GC(V,EC) is
defined with EC ⊆ V ×V denoting the set of communication
links between the players. (i, j) ∈ EC if and only if players i
and j communicate. The set of neighbors of player i in GC ,
denoted by NC(i), is defined as NC(i) := {j ∈ V |(i, j) ∈
EC}. In order to reduce the number of communications
between players, we design a GC such that only the required
information is exchanged.
Assumption 2. The communication graph GC satisfies
• Gm ⊆ GC ⊆ GI , if GI has a maximal triangle-free
spanning subgraph, Gm,
• GC = GI , otherwise.
A Nash equilibrium can be efficiently computed by solving
a variational inequality V I(Ω, F ) where Ω ⊂ RN is the
action set of all players and F : Ω → RN is a pseudo-
gradient mapping defined as F (x) := [∇xiJi(xi)]i∈V [21].
In the following we state a few assumptions for the
existence and the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium.
Assumption 3. For every i ∈ V , the action set Ωi is a non-
empty, compact and convex subset of R. Ji(xi, xi−i) is a
continuously differentiable function in xi, jointly continuous
in xi and convex in xi for every xi−i.
The compactness of Ω implies that ∀i ∈ V and xi ∈ Ωi,
‖∇xiJi(xi)‖ ≤ C, for some C > 0. (3)
Assumption 4. F : Ω→ RN is strictly monotone,
(F (x)− F (y))T (x− y) > 0 ∀x, y ∈ Ω, x 6= y. (4)
Assumption 5. ∇xiJi(xi, u) is Lipschitz continuous in xi,
for every fixed u ∈ Ωi−i and for every i ∈ V , i.e., there exists
σi > 0 such that
‖∇xiJi(xi,u)−∇xiJi(yi,u)‖≤σi‖xi−yi‖ ∀xi, yi ∈ Ωi. (5)
Moreover, ∇xiJi(xi, u) is Lipschitz continuous in u with
a Lipschitz constant Li > 0 for every fixed xi ∈ Ωi, ∀i ∈ V .
Our objective is to find an algorithm for computing a Nash
equilibrium of G(V,Ωi, Ji, GI) with partially coupled cost
functions as described by GI(V,EI) using only imperfect
information over the communication graph GC(V,EC).
III. ASYNCHRONOUS GOSSIP-BASED ALGORITHM
We propose a distributed algorithm, using an asynchronous
gossip-based method in [18]. We obtain a Nash equilibrium
of G(V,Ωi, Ji, GI) by solving the associated V I problem
by a projected gradient-based approach with diminishing
step size. The mechanism of the algorithm can be briefly
explained as follows: Each player builds and maintains an
estimate xˆij , j ∈ N˜I(i) of the actions which affect his
cost function (as in GI ) and locally communicates with his
neighbors over GC to exchange his estimates and update his
action.
The algorithm is elaborated in the following steps:
1- Initialization Step: Each player i maintains an initial
temporary estimate for the players whose actions affect his
cost function, x˜ij(0) ∈ Ωj ⊂ R, j ∈ N˜I(i).
2- Gossiping Step: At the gossiping step, player ik wakes
up at T (k) and selects a communication neighbor indexed
by jk ∈ NC(ik). They exchange their temporary estimate
vectors and construct their estimate of the players whose
actions affect their cost functions.
The estimates are computed as in the following:
1)
xˆikl (k) =
x˜
ik
l (k)+x˜
jk
l (k)
2 , l ∈ (NI(ik) ∩ N˜I(jk))
xˆjkl (k) =
x˜
ik
l (k)+x˜
jk
l (k)
2 , l ∈ (NI(jk) ∩ N˜I(ik)).
(6)
2)
{
xˆikr (k)= x˜
ik
r (k), r ∈ N˜I(ik)\(NI(ik) ∩ N˜I(jk))
xˆjkr (k)= x˜
jk
r (k), r ∈ N˜I(jk)\(NI(jk) ∩ N˜I(ik)).
(7)
3) For all other i /∈ {ik, jk},
xˆij(k) = x˜
i
j(k), ∀i /∈ {ik, jk}, ∀j ∈ N˜I(i). (8)
Note that the player i’s estimate of his action is indeed his
action, i.e., x˜ii(k) = xi(k) for all i ∈ V .
3- Local Step: All the players update their actions according
to a projected gradient-based method. Let xˆi = (xˆii, xˆ
i
−i) ∈
Ωi, with xˆii ∈ Ωi as player i’s estimate of his action and
xˆi−i ∈ Ωi−i as the estimate of the players whose actions
affect player i’s cost function. Player i updates his action as
follows: if i ∈ {ik, jk},
xi(k + 1) = TΩi [xi(k)− αk,i∇xiJi(xi(k), xˆi−i(k))], (9)
otherwise, xi(k + 1) = xi(k). In (9), TΩi : R → Ωi is an
Euclidean projection and αk,i are diminishing step sizes such
that
∑∞
k=1 α
2
k,i < ∞,
∑∞
k=1 αk,i = ∞ ∀i ∈ V . Note that
αk,i is inversely related to the number of updates νk(i) that
each player i has made until time k (i.e., αk,i = 1νk(i) ).
At this moment all the temporary estimates are updated
for every i ∈ V, j ∈ N˜I(i) as follows:
x˜ij(k + 1) =
{
xˆij(k), if i 6= j
xi(k + 1), if i = j.
(10)
In (10) for j = i, player i’s temporary estimate is updated
by his action. At this point, the players begin a new iteration
from step 2.
The algorithm is inspired by [18] except that only the
required information is exchanged. When GI is not complete,
the proposed algorithm can offer substantial savings.
IV. CONVERGENCE FOR DIMINISHING STEP SIZE
Consider a memory Mk to denote the sigma-field gener-
ated by the history up to time k − 1 with M0 = M1 =
{x˜i(0), i ∈ V }.
Mk =M0 ∪
{
(il, jl); 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1
}
, ∀k ≥ 2.
For player i, let mi := deg(i) + 1 where deg(i) is the
degree of vertex i ∈ V in GI . Let also m :=
∑N
i=1mi and
m := [m1, . . . ,mN ]T ∈ RN .
Remark 1. Assumption 1 implies that mi > 1, ∀i ∈ V and
m > N . If GI is a complete graph (or in other words if the
cost functions are fully coupled), then m = N2.
The following lemma holds for GI and GC .
Lemma 1. Let GI and GC satisfying Assumptions 1, 2. Then
every estimate is exchanged after sufficiently many iterations.
In the following we write the algorithm in a compact form.
Let B = A + IN ∈ RN×N , where A = [aij ]i,j∈V is the
adjacency matrix associated with GI with aij = 1 if (i, j) ∈
EI and aij = 0 otherwise. Let also
sij :=
j∑
l=1
B(i, l) + δi6=1
i−1∑
r=1
mr, (11)
where δi 6=1 = 1 if i 6= 1 and δi6=1 = 0 if i = 1. For each
pair i, j ∈ V , we assign a vector Eij ∈ Rm.
Eij =
{
esij , if i ∈ V, j ∈ N˜I(i)
0m, if i ∈ V, j /∈ N˜I(i),
(12)
where ei is a unit vector in Rm whose i-th element is 1 and
0m is the all zeros vector in Rm.
The communication matrix W (k) is defined as
W (k) := Im− 1
2
∑
l∈ind(ik,jk)
(Eikl −Ejkl )(Eikl −Ejkl )T , (13)
where ind(ik, jk) := {z ∈ V : B(ik, z) ·B(jk, z) = 1} is the
set of indices that belong to N˜I(ik)∩N˜I(jk) for ik, jk ∈ NC .
Remark 2. W (k) is a generalized communication matrix.
For the fully coupled case (i.e., N˜I(i) = V ), it reduces to
the definition in [18], i.e., W (k) =
(
IN − (eik − ejk)(eik −
ejk)
T
)⊗ IN where ei is a unit vector in RN .
The definition (13) implies that W (k) is a doubly stochas-
tic matrix such that W (k)T1m = W (k)1m = 1m where 1m
is the all ones vector in Rm.
Let x˜(k) :=
[
x˜1
T
, . . . , x˜N
T ]T
be the stack vector of all
temporary estimates and x¯(k) = W (k)x˜(k). Then, xˆi−i(k) =
[x¯r(k)]r∈I(i), where I(i) := {d : d = sij , j ∈ NI(i)} and
sij is as in (11).
The convergence proof has two steps:
1) First, we prove almost sure convergence of the tem-
porary estimate vector to the average of all temporary
estimate vectors (Theorem 1).
2) Secondly, we prove convergence of the actions toward
the Nash equilibrium, almost surely (Theorem 2).
The average of all temporary estimates of the players is
denoted by z(k) ∈ RN . Let z(k) := H¯x˜(k) ∈ RN where,
H¯ := diag(1./m)HT ∈ RN×m, (14)
1./m := [
1
m1
, . . . ,
1
mN
]T ,
H := [
N∑
i=1
Ei1, . . . ,
N∑
i=1
EiN ] ∈ Rm×N . (15)
The augmented average of all temporary estimates is as
follows:
Z(k) := Hz(k) = HH¯x˜(k). (16)
The convergence proof depends on some key properties of
W and H given in Lemma 2-5.
Lemma 2. Let W(k) and H be defined in (13) and (15). The
following properties hold:
WT (k)W (k) = W (k), W (k)H = H, HTW (k) = HT .
Lemma 3. Let Q(k) :=W(k)−HH¯W(k). Then Q(k)Z(k)=0.
Lemma 4. Let R := Im −HH¯ with H , H¯ defined in (15),
(14). Then ‖R‖ = 1, where ‖ · ‖ denoting the reduced norm.
Lemma 5. Let Q(k) := W (k) − HH¯W (k) and γ =
λmax
(
E[Q(k)TQ(k)]
)
. Then γ < 1.
Using Lemmas 2-5, we show in the following theorem
that under Assumptions 1-3 x˜(k) converges to Z(k).
Theorem 1. Let x˜(k) be the stack vector with all temporary
estimates and Z(k) be its average as in (16). Let also
αk,max = maxi∈V αk,i. Then under Assumptions 1-3,
i)
∑∞
k=0 αk,max‖x˜(k)− Z(k)‖ <∞,
ii)
∑∞
k=0 ‖x˜(k)− Z(k)‖2 <∞.
Theorem 1 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let z(k) := H¯x˜(k) ∈ RN be the average of
all players’ temporary estimates. Under Assumptions 1-3, the
following hold for players’ actions x(k).
i)
∑∞
k=0 αk,max‖x(k)− z(k)‖ <∞,
ii)
∑∞
k=0 ‖x(k)− z(k)‖2 <∞.
By Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, x˜(k) and x(k) converge
to Z(k) and z(k), respectively as k →∞.
Theorem 2. Let x(k) and x∗ be all players’ actions and the
Nash equilibrium of G, respectively. Under Assumptions 1-5,
the sequence {x(k)} generated by the algorithm converges
to x∗, almost surely.
V. CONVERGENCE RATE
In this section we compare the convergence rate of the
algorithm proposed in Section III (denoted as Algorithm 1)
with the algorithm in [18] (denoted as Algorithm 2). Al-
gorithm 1 is an extension of Algorithm 2 by considering
partially-coupled cost functions for the players via GI .
Algorithm 2 operates as if a fully-coupled cost function
is assigned to each player and the interference graph is
complete.
By Assumption 2, any feasible communication graph for
Algorithm 1 has a lower bound Gm, however, the commu-
nication graph for Algorithm 2 can be minimally connected.
Thus, for the best case scenario we expect more iterations
for Algorithm 1 than Algorithm 2 from the point of view of
the parameters associated with GC .
In the following, we compare Algorithm 1 and Algo-
rithm 2 from the point of view of GI . We can show that for
each iteration, Algorithm 1 needs less time than Algorithm 2
since less information (estimate) is needed to be exchanged.
For the sake of comparison, we assume that both algo-
rithms run over the same GC ⊇ Gm. Let r be the time
required to exchange an estimate, and let s be the time
required to process a full gradient. Note that the processing
time for the gradient is linearly dependent on the data set.
We ignore the time required to compute the projection in the
local step. Thus for each iteration, the average time required
to exchange all the estimates between players i and j and to
update the actions under Algorithm 1 is
T 1av :=
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈NC(i)
1
N
pij
(
|NI(i) ∩NI(j)|r + mi
N
s
)
, (17)
where pij is the probability that players i and j contact each
other. |NI(i) ∩ NI(j)|r is the time required to exchange
all the estimates of player i which affect player j’s cost
function except player i’s action. miN s is the time required
to compute ∇xiJi(xi, xi−i), noting that s is the processing
time for computing ∇xiJi(xi, x−i).
In Algorithm 2 the average time for each iteration is
computed by replacing |NI(i)∩NI(j)| and mi in (17) with
N − 1 and N , respectively. Then we obtain,
T 2av := (N − 1)r + s, (18)
where
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈NC(i)
1
N pij = 1. Note that |NI(i) ∩
NI(j)| ≤ N − 1 and mi ≤ N which implies T 1av ≤ T 2av.
In the following, we discuss the number of iterations
required for each algorithm such that the players’ actions
converge to a Nash equilibrium. To simplify the analysis,
we assume constant step sizes (i.e., αk,i = αi). Note that for
constant step sizes there exists a steady-state offset between
x(k) and x∗, see [18]. Let this minimum value of error
be denoted by d∗, i.e., infk ‖x(k) − x∗‖ = d∗. We use a
modified -averaging time similar to Definition 1 in [22] for
the convergence time.
Definition 2. For any 0 <  < 1, the -averaging time of an
algorithm, Nav(), is defined as
Nav() :=sup
x(0)
inf
{
k :Pr
(‖x(k)−x∗‖−d∗
‖x(0)‖ ≥
)
≤
}
. (19)
By Definition 2, Nav() is the minimum number of itera-
tions it takes for ‖x(k)− x∗‖ to approach an -ball around
d∗ with a high probability, regardless of x(0). The following
assumption guarantees Nav() to be well-defined.
Assumption 6. We assume a non-zero minimum value,
denoted by xmin(0), for the norm of the initial action of player
i for i ∈ V , i.e., ‖xi(0)‖ ≥ xmin(0) > 0.
We obtain a lower bound for the -averaging time under
Algorithms 1, 2 by applying Markov’s inequality: for any
random variable X ≥ 0 and  > 0, the following holds:
Pr(X ≥ ) ≤ E[X]

. (20)
For constant step sizes we consider the following assumption
rather than Assumption 4.
Assumption 7. F : Ω → RN is strongly monotone on Ω
with a constant µ > 0, i.e.,
(F (x)− F (y))T (x− y) ≥ µ‖x− y‖2 ∀x, y ∈ Ω. (21)
Theorem 3. Let αi be constant step sizes which satisfy 0 <
φ < 1 where,
φ := 1 + (1 + ρ2 + 2αmax)pmaxαmax− (1 + ρ2 + 2µ)pminαmin,
(22)
with pmax = maxi∈V pi, pmin = mini∈V pi, αmax =
maxi∈V αi, αmin = mini∈V αi, ρ be the Lipschitz constant of
F and µ be the positive constant for the strong monotonicity
property of F . Under Assumptions 1-3, 5, 6, 7, the -
averaging time Nav() is bounded as follows:
Nav() ≥
log a3−b
log 1√γ
,
where γ = E
[
‖Q(k)‖2
∣∣∣Mk] (as in Lemma 5), Q(k) =
[(W (k) − 1N 1N1TNW (k)) ⊗ IN ], and a, b are positive and
increasing with γ.
Proof . The proof follows by upper bounding E
[
‖x(k +
1)−x∗‖2
]
and then using Markov’s inequality (20) to obtain
a lower bound for Nav(). First, we start to find an upper
bound for E
[
‖x˜(k + 1) − Z(k + 1)‖
]
which is required to
upper bound E[‖x(k+1)−x∗‖2]. After some manipulations
one can obtain,
E
[
‖x˜(k + 1)− Z(k + 1)‖2
]
≤ C1√γk+1 + C2, (23)
where C1, C2 > 0 depend on γ, αmax and N . Using (23),
after some manipulations one can obtain,
E
[
‖x(k + 1)− x∗‖2
]
≤ C3 + C4√γk, (24)
where C3 :=
max{Nx2max,4NC2pmaxα2max+2L2pmaxC2}
1−φ and
C4 :=
2L2pmaxC1
1−φ , φ is as defined in (22), L = maxi∈V Li
and Li is a Lipschitz constant (Assumption 5). Recall that
infk ‖x(k)− x∗‖ = d∗. Then,
d∗2 = inf
k
‖x(k)− x∗‖2 ≤ lim
k→∞
E[‖x(k)− x∗‖2] ≤ C3. (25)
Since 0 < φ < 1, by using Markov’s inequality (20) and
(24) the following inequality follows,
Pr
(‖x(k)− x∗‖ − d∗
‖x(0)‖ ≥ 
)
≤ −2C4
√
γk + C3 − d∗2
‖x(0)‖2 . (26)
Using Definition 2 and Assumption 6, one can obtain a lower
bound for Nav() from (26),
Nav() ≥
log a3−b
log 1√γ
, (27)
where a := C4x−2min and b := (C3−d∗2)x−2min. By Lemma 5,
(25) and the condition on φ, 0 < φ < 1, a and b are positive
and increasing functions of γ. 
Lemma 6. Let W¯ := E[W (k)] be the expected communica-
tion matrix. Then W¯ is doubly stochastic with λmax(W¯ ) =
1. Let λ2(W¯ ) be second largest eigenvalue of W¯ , i.e.,
λ2(W¯ ) := maxλ6=1 λ(W¯ ). Then γ as defined in Lemma 5,
γ = λmax
(
E[Q(k)TQ(k)]
)
satisfies γ = λ2(W¯ ).
By Lemma 6, γ is equal to the second largest eigenvalue
of W¯ which can be derived as follows: W¯ = Im −∑
i∈V
∑
j∈NC (i)
∑
l∈ind(i,j)(E
i
l−Ejl )(Eil−Ejl )T
2
∑
i∈V degGC (i)
. This leads us to
conclude that the number of iterations is dependent on the
structure of the expected communication matrix, hence the
parameters associated with the interference and the commu-
nication graphs. Note that (26) reveals that Nav() is not
only dependent on γ but also dependent on φ (22), which is
a parameter associated with the cost functions.
To sum up this section, from the perspective of parameters
associated with GI , we can conclude that each iteration
length is reduced when we consider the interference graph.
Moreover, the number of iterations for each algorithm is
tightly dependent on the second largest eigenvalue of the
expected communication matrix hence on GC .
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we present a numerical example and
compare Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Consider a Wireless
Ad-Hoc Network (WANET) which consists of 16 mobile
nodes interconnected by multi-hop communication paths
[23]. Consider Nah = {1, . . . , 16} as the set of wireless
nodes and Lah = {Ll}l∈L as the set of links connecting the
nodes with L = {1, . . . , 16} as the set of link indices. Let
V = {U1, . . . , U15} denote the set of users (players) who
want to use this wireless network to transfer data. Fig. 1 (a)
represents the topology of the WANET in which a unique
path is assigned to each user to transfer his data from the
source to the destination node. Each Ui is characterized by
a set of links (path), Ri, i ∈ V .
The interferences of the users to each other are represented
in Fig. 1 (b). Nodes specify the users and edges demonstrate
which users have a common link in their paths. Each link
Lj ∈ Lah has a positive capacity Cj > 0 for j ∈ L. Each
Ui, Ui ∈ V , sends a non-negative flow xi, 0 ≤ xi ≤ 10,
over Ri. For each Ui, a cost function Ji is defined as
Ji(xi, x
i
−i) :=
∑
j:Lj∈Ri
κ
Cj −
∑
w:Lj∈Rw xw
−χi log(xi+1),
where κ is a positive network-wide known parameter and χi
is a positive user-specific parameter. The notation a : b ∈ c
translates into ”set of a’s such that b is contained in c”.
We investigate the effectiveness of Algorithm 1 over the
communication graph GC which is depicted in Fig. 1 (c).
Then we compare its convergence rate with Algorithm 2 over
the same GC . Let χi = 10 for i ∈ V and Cj = 10 for
j ∈ L. Fig. 2 and Fig 3 show convergence of Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2 for diminishing step sizes, respectively. The
dashed lines represent the Nash equilibrium of this game.
For Algorithm 1 after 6000 iterations and Algorithm 2 after
30000 iterations, the normalized error (‖x−x
∗‖
‖x∗‖ × 100%) is
3.93%. Algorithm 1 needs 5 times fewer iterations, and each
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Fig. 1: (a) Wireless Ad-Hoc Network. (b) Interference graph
of the Wireless Ad-Hoc Network GI (left). (c) Communica-
tion graph for the Wireless Ad-Hoc Network GC (right).
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Fig. 2: Flow rates and total flow rates (Algorithm 1).
iteration is 6 times shorter. Thus, Algorithm 1 is 30 times
faster than Algorithm 2 in this example.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A gossip algorithm is proposed to find a Nash equilib-
rium over a network. A connected interference graph is
used to illustrate the locality of the cost functions. Then,
a generalized communication graph is designed for the
players to exchange only their required information. Using
standard assumptions on the cost functions, interference and
communication graph we proved the convergence to a Nash
equilibrium. The convergence rate of the algorithm is then
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Fig. 3: Flow rates and total flow rates (Algorithm 2).
studied and the effect of the second largest eigenvalue of the
expected communication matrix is investigated.
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